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Civility, Enlightenment, and Society: 
Conceptual Confusions and Kantian Remedies 
JAMES SCHMIDT Boston University 
Critics of what is called the "Enlightenment project" have argued that it has been responsible for a number of current social pathologies. At the same time, the term "civil society" has been used to designate those patterns of solidarity that the Enlightenment project allegedly disrupts. This article ( I )  
argues that characterizations of the Enlightenment project tend to be elusive and historically questionable, 
(2)suggests that the concept of civil society is ambiguous in both its object and its intent, (3)explores how 
Kant provided a more rigorous account of the relationship between enlightenment and civil society, an 
account which rests on a contrast between civil and cosmopolitan society, and (4) considers some of the 
dificulties that plague attempts to define "civility" as a virtue. 
riting in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1784, 
Immanuel Kant speculated that the "hidden 
plan of nature" was to bring about justice in 
civil society and peaceful relations between nations by 
means of the very antagonism that seemed to promise 
only civil unrest and international conflict. He assured 
his readers that "though folly and caprice creep in at all 
times, enlightenment gradually arises," and thus the 
"chiliastic expectations" of philosophy for the triumph 
of justice were something more than an illusion (Kant 
[I7841 1923,27-8). As we close this millennium, Kant's 
"chiliastic expectations" regarding enlightenment and 
civil society do not appear to be generally shared. 
Over the last several decades, a remarkably diverse 
group of philosophers and social critics have traced the 
origin of a number of social and cultural maladies to 
something they call the "Enlightenment project." Over 
the same period, an equally diverse group of political 
and social commentators have hailed the promise of, 
lamented the demise of, or sought ways to reinvigorate 
what they call "civil society." The concerns at stake in 
these discussions would appear to be related. As Kant's 
essay shows, the nature,and promise of civil society 
were important concerns in the Enlightenment. Yet, 
with a few exceptions, current debates over the viability 
of the Enlightenment project and discussions of the 
prospects for civil society are conducted in different 
registers. On those rare occasions when the relation- 
ship between the two notions is broached, some com- 
mentators tend to see greater difficulties than Kant. 
Consider, for example, the explanation that Berger 
and Neuhaus ([I9761 1996, 161) offer for the tendency 
of liberalism to underestimate the role played by 
"mediating structures" in public policy: 
Liberalism's blindness to mediating structures can be 
traced to its Enlightenment roots. Enlightenment thought 
is abstract, universalistic, addicted to what Burke called 
"geometry" in social policy. The concrete particularities of 
mediating structures find an inhospitable soil in the liberal 
garden. There the great concern is for the individual ("the 
rights of man") and for a just public order, but anything "in 
between" is viewed as irrelevant, or even an obstacle, to 
the rational ordering of society. What lies in between is 
dismissed, to the extent it can be, as superstition, bigotry, 
or (more recently) cultural lag.' 
This argument repeats a long-standing charge against 
the Enlightenment: While it proved effective in tearing 
down what tradition had wrought, it was unable to 
foster those mediating structures which sustain civil 
society. This was the common theme of such otherwise 
dissimilar works as Burke's Reflections on the Revolu- 
tion in France ([I7901 1987) and Tocqueville's The 
Ancien Rdgime and the French Revolution ([I8561 1955). 
Such an argument also played a central role in Hegel's 
account of the relationship between the Enlightenment 
and the Terror in the Phenomenology of Spirit ([I8061 
1977). Something similar may be found in Nietzsche's 
suggestion that the Enlightenment's critique of religion 
was but the first step toward a critique of the idols of 
science, morality, and reason that carried with it the 
prospect of a collapse into nihilism. 
This paper proposes that arguments of this sort rest 
on confusions about what the Enlightenment involved 
and what civil society implies. They invoke a charac- 
terization of the Enlightenment that is historically 
questionable and an understanding of civil society that 
is rarely clearly defined. To understand what is amiss, it 
will be necessary to (1) examine the radically different 
ways in which the Enlightenment is understood by 
social critics and by historians, (2) explore some of the 
ambiguities that plague the concept of civil society, (3) 
return to Kant, in order to consider an alternative way 
of thinking about the relationship between Enlighten- 
ment and civil society, and (4) consider some of the 
difficulties that plague accounts of the virtue of civility. 
CRITICIZING THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
PROJECT 
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enment has become so pervasive that many commen- 
tators, as Wilson (1987,53) observed, find it impossible 
to resist the temptation to 
take a punch at enlightenment thought. . . . It is difficult to 
get through an academic day without having to witness 
somebody jabbing away just to enjoy the pleasure of 
getting off on the demystification of the functioning of 
humanist ideals or slapping the Enlightenment around 
with the intention of knocking it out of its stupor and 
redeeming the hopes of mastery of nature by reason. 
Wilson's quip highlights one of the more distinctive 
features of recent criticisms of the Enlightenment 
project: Today, punches are thrown from the Left as 
well as the Right, and the Enlightenment stands ac- 
cused not only of undermining tradition but also of 
reinforcing patriarchy, fostering anti-Semitism, sustain- 
ing an ideology of white supremacy, embracing a vision 
that sees progress only in terms of the ever-increasing 
subjugation of nature, and-more generally-harbor-
ing a hostility toward "otherness" in any of its forms 
(Schmidt 1996,l). As a way of sorting out the different 
charges that have been raised, it might be useful to 
outline, briefly, three different versions of the critique 
of the Enlightenment project. 
The first and perhaps most familiar line of criticism 
argues that the indifference of Enlightenment ration- 
ality to traditional norms and practices destroys the ties 
that bind individuals together into societies, paving the 
way for complete anarchy or the rule of brute force. 
The locus classicus for this interpretation is Burke's 
Reflections on the Revolution in France. Criticizing 
French "literary men and politicians" as having "no 
respect for the wisdom of others," Burke argues that 
the fatal flaw of the Enlightenment lay in its habit of 
"exploding general prejudices" rather than seeking "to 
discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them." 
Because "prejudice, with its reason," is capable of 
moving men to actiqn in a way that "naked reason" 
cannot, it is wiser "to continue the prejudice, with the 
reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice 
and leave nothing but the naked reason" (Burke [I7901 
1987, 76-7). More recent versions of this line of 
criticism may be found in Oakeshott's ([I9621 1991) 
critique of political "rationalism" or Gadamer's ([I9601 
1989) critique of the Enlightenment's "prejudice 
against prejudice." We also find it in passing swipes at 
the Enlightenment by conservative and neoconserva- 
tive commentators. 
A second line of criticism originates in Hegel's 
discussion, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, of the 
transformation of Enlightenment- into Terror. While 
much of Hegel's imagery bears a striking resemblance 
to Burke, his argument differs in crucial ways. Where 
Burke sought to defend the reason of tradition against 
the abstractions of philosophers, Hegel argues that the 
central failing of the Enlightenment was that it was 
insufficiently enlightened about the limitations of its 
own conception of reason. The struggle between faith 
and Enlightenment turns out to be little more than 
shadow boxing, since all that Enlightenment can offer 
in place of religious faith is a faith of a different sort: a 
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belief in the primacy of the category of utility. Enlight- 
enment proves to be "irresistible" in its struggle with 
faith, but its victory is a bitter one, as is amply 
demonstrated, in Hegel's view, by the collapse of the 
French Revolution into Terror. A politics guided by 
utility alone can produce nothing except "the coldest, 
shallowest of deaths, with no more significance than 
cleaving a cabbage head or swallowing a gulp of water" 
(Hegel [I8061 1977, 360, translation modified).' A 
more recent version of this line of criticism can be 
found in the account of the self-destruction of Enlight- 
enment sketched by Horkheimer and Adorno ([I9471 
1972).3 
A third line of criticism originates in the work of 
Nietzsche, whose stance toward the Enlightenment 
reflects a profound ambivalence. In some of his discus- 
sions of the Enlightenment he calls for the rescue of 
what he characterizes as its original aristocratic ideals 
from the contaminating influences of democracy and 
egalitarianism that he associates with Rousseau and 
the French Revolution (Nietzsche [I8781 1986, 169, 
367; [I8821 1974, 293; [I8881 1968b, 101-2). On other 
occasions, however, he suggests that the Enlighten- 
ment's critique of religion was but the first faltering 
step in the direction of a thoroughgoing critique of the 
idols of science, morality, and reason, and this carried 
within it both the danger of a collapse into nihilism and 
the promise of a new Enlightenment in which the idea 
of aesthetic self-fashioning would replace the search 
for universal values (Nietzsche [I8821 1974, 181; [1883- 
881 1968a, 56). Nietzsche's present-day heirs are a 
motley lot, encompassing both those who, like Gray 
(1995), share his conviction that the Enlightenment 
paves the way to nihilism but who reject his aestheti- 
cization of ethics and those who, like Foucault, are 
more concerned with exploring the workings of power 
and knowledge than with meditating on the danger of 
nihilism (Schmidt and Wartenberg 1994). 
Each of these lines of criticism has a different sense 
of what ought to be done in the face of the damage 
allegedly wrought by the Enlightenment. The solution 
of latter-day Burkeans is perhaps the most familiar: 
They counsel a defense of traditional norms where they 
still survive, a distrust for any social policy that smacks 
of rational "social engineering," and support for mea- 
sures that strengthen the damaged "mediating institu- 
tions" of civil society. Those who take Hegel's account 
as their point of departure, in contrast, are concerned 
to elaborate a conception of rationality that seeks to 
transcend the limits of instrumental reason (Habermas 
1987). And Nietzsche's present-day disciples may, like 
Gray, embrace Heidegger's notion of Gelassenheit as a 
means of avoiding the nihilism they see inherent in the 
Will to Power (Gray 1996, 182-3) or seek, as Foucault 
did in his last writings, to redefine Enlightenment as an 
open-ended project of self-creation (Foucault 1984, 
For a discussion of the peculiar images Hegel employs, see Schmidt 
1998. 
Horkheimer himself saw the work as an elaboration of Hegel's 
basic thesis. See his letter to Friedrich Pollock of May 7, 1943 
(Horkheimer 1996, 446). 
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32-50). But if the proposed antidotes for the damage 
done by the Enlightenment are remarkably diverse, the 
picture of the Enlightenment that emerges from these 
critics is strikingly consistent. Let us review its main 
features. 
First, the Enlightenment is routinely charactikized 
as embracing a conception of reason that is held to be 
insufficiently sensitive to its own limits. Sometimes it is 
criticized for underestimating the degree to which 
norms and values can be detached from traditions and 
conventions of everyday life, resulting-as MacIntyre 
(1981) has argued-in a situation in which moral 
discourse has lost all meaning. Other critics charge that 
it embraces a restricted understanding of reason, mod- 
eled on the natural sciences, which equates reason with 
the successful manipulation of nature, resulting in the 
rule of "instrumental reason" (Horkheimer 1947). Still 
others suggest that it naively underestimated the role 
played by passions and sentiments in human conduct 
and, as a result, leads to a wildly impractical politics, 
which Oakeshott ([I9621 1991, 27-31)characterized as 
a "politics of the book" or an "abridgement of a 
tradition." Whatever the particular form of the criti- 
cism, the central charge remains the same: The En- 
lightenment represents an uncritical rationalism that is 
dangerously unaware of the complexity of reality. 
Closely related is the charge that, because the En- 
lightenment loses itself in abstract universality, it has 
an ignorance of, or worse still, a contempt for the 
particular, the local, the specific. According to Oake- 
shott ([I9621 1991, 9), the "political rationalism" that is 
the bitter legacy of the Enlightenment combines a 
"politics of perfection" with a "politics of uniformity." 
Horkheimer and Adorno ([I9471 1972, 6) provide an 
even more chilling image: Enlightenment, in their view, 
is inherently "totalitarian." Critics from the Left have 
charged that its talk of universal rights remained 
oblivious to inequalities in gender, race, and class, 
while those on the Right argue that by reducing all 
social relations to a series of abstract and impersonal 
rights, it tears the fabric of society to pieces. In all these 
cases, the Enlightenment stands accused not simply of 
being uncritically rationalist but of being insufficiently 
concerned with particularity. 
It is further argued that the abstract, uncritical 
conception of reason embraced by the Enlightenment 
culminates in an obsession with domination and con- 
trol. Thus, in Foucault's Discipline and Punish (1979), 
the prisoners who have been freed from the darkness 
of the dungeon are captured all the more securely in 
the light that floods through the Panopticon. In 
Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment 
([I9471 1972), the ultimate project of the Enlighten- 
ment is the domination of nature and of other human 
beings. And for Gray (1996, 166, 180), the Enlighten- 
ment project is yet another manifestation of that "Will 
to Power" which lies at the heart of the "Western 
humanist hubris." 
Finally, the Enlightenment's critics are united in the 
conviction that there is such a thing as an Enlighten-
ment project-that it is possible to attribute a common 
set of intentions to a rather diverse group of thinkers, 
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scattered across a number of different nations. Critics 
may differ on how exactly this project is to be defined, 
just as there is considerable difference, from critic to 
critic, as to who counts as a representative of it. But 
central to all these criticisms is the conviction that it 
makes sense to speak of a single, coherent Enlighten- 
ment project. While such a possibility is taken as 
unproblematic by the critics, their confidence is hardly 
reflected in historical accounts of the period. 
In a recent overview, Outram (1995) observed that 
as historians of the Enlightenment have moved from an 
examination of a limited canon of works by a few 
famous (and typically French) authors to a consider- 
ation of the Enlightenment as a social, political, and 
cultural transformation exhibiting a remarkable range 
of national and confessional variations, it has become 
more difficult to speak of the Enlightenment as "a 
unitary phenomenon." "It might . . . seem that as our 
picture of the Enlightenment became more complex, as 
we have begun to study ideas not as autonomous, 
discrete objects, but as deeply embedded in society, so 
the term Enlightenment itself might have become 
increasingly obscure or even meaningless" (Outram 
1995, 12). 
To the extent that it is still possible to impute an 
identity to the Enlightenment, Outram (1995, 12) 
suggests that it must be viewed "as a capsule containing 
sets of debates, stresses and concerns, which however 
differently formulated or responded to, do appear to be 
characteristic of the way in which ideas, opinions and 
social and political structures interacted and changed 
in the eighteenth century." This diversity is precisely 
what the critics tend to overlook when they speak as if 
there were a single, unitary Enlightenment project. 
Gray's Enlightenment's Wake (1995) exemplifies how 
far afield a critic can go when trying to define the 
Enlightenment project. Turning first to MacIntyre's 
Afrer Virtue (1981), he argues that while Enlightenment 
thinkers may have held differing views on other topics, 
they were at one in calling for "an independent rational 
justification of morality" (Gray 1995, 147). Rather 
quickly, he extends the Enlightenment project to em- 
brace the "refounding" of "society" as well as "moral- 
ity" on "universal, tradition-independent rational prin- 
ciples," a project to which "liberalism as a doctrine was, 
in all of its varieties, unreservedly committed" (pp. 
149-50). A few pages later, the "Enlightenment project 
of human self-emancipation" is characterized as the 
"naturalistic form" of the "most fundamental Western 
commitment, the humanist conception of humankind 
as a privileged site of truth," a commitment that had 
been expressed in both "Socratic inquiry and in Chris- 
tian revelation" (p. 155). Having equated the Enlight- 
enment project with liberalism and humanism, Gray 
next characterizes it as also embracing the "modernist 
world-view," with its "conception of science as the 
supremely privileged form of knowledge," a supremacy 
that is, in turn, defined in terms of a view of the natural 
world as "an object of human exploitation" (p. 158). 
Within a few more pages, a "commitment to ration- 
alism" becomes one of the "defining elements of the 
modernist world-view of which the Enlightenment 
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project is the most powerful expression" (p. 160). 
Several paragraphs later, the Enlightenment is charac- 
terized as "foundationalist," "representationalist," and 
"logocentric" (p. 160). 
In Gray's account, the definition has so many differ- 
ing characteristics that it is uncertain whether4 makes 
sense to speak of a single, all-encompassing project. 
The attempt to provide "an independent rational jus- 
tification of morality" (the characterization of the 
Enlightenment project that Gray takes from MacIn- 
tyre) does not require or even imply a view of the 
natural world as "an object of human exploitation" (a 
characterization Gray takes from Heidegger and from 
Horkheimer and Adorno). While the primacy accorded 
to the natural sciences merges rather easily into the 
project of the domination of nature, it is not entirely 
obvious that an "independent rational justification of 
morality" must ultimately be grounded in the natural 
sciences: For a thinker such as Kant, it obviously was 
not. It is also less than clear that "liberalism" is 
necessarily part of the Enlightenment project: Not all 
advocates of Enlightenment embraced liberalism, and 
there were eloquent defenders of liberalism who were 
also vigorous critics of the Enlightenment.4 It is easy 
enough to make the "foundationalist," "representa-
tionalist," and "logocentric" characterization (after all, 
is not everything since the pre-Socratics "representa- 
tionalist" and "logocentrist"?), but the price is to 
obscure a good deal of difference bebeen  a founda- 
tionalist procedure which, following Descartes, seeks 
to find a ground for reason and Kant's attempt to 
provide what O'Neill (1989, 3-27) has described as a 
"constructivist" vindication of reason.5 
Accounts of the failure of the Enlightenment project 
such as Gray's typically tend to rest on criticisms of a 
number of separate and detachable claims. Thus, when 
critics take aim at the project's "rationalism," they are 
raising questions about the ability of reason to provide 
a grounding for law ?r morality. When they criticize its 
"scientism," they are questioning the adequacy of a 
criterion of rationality that is measured in terms of 
instrumental efficacy. When they point to its naive 
commitment to "progress," they are questioning the 
possibility of evaluating all societies and cultures in 
terms of a single measure of "development." Cobbling 
distinguishable claims such as these into something 
called the Enlightenment project misses an essential 
point: Criticisms of these very same claims were ad- 
vanced by thinkers typically associated with the En- 
lightenment. Hume, for example, had doubts about the 
prospect of constructing a moral philosophy grounded 
on reason alone, Kant's entire critical philosophy can 
be viewed as an attempt to defineieason in something 
other than instrumentalist terms, and both Voltaire 
and Diderot offered extensive criticisms of the idea of 
progress. What is bravely called the Enlightenment 
For one example, see Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, "Something 
Lessing Said" (Schmidt 1996, 191-211). 
"Post-modernist" critics almost habitually equate Descartes and 
Kant. See, for example, Cornel West's comments on what he calls the 
"Cartesian-Kantian picture" (West 1979, 68). 
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project thus turns out to be a pastiche of arguments, 
each of which-when viewed separately-would find 
critics within the Enlightenment itself. 
Thus, current discussions of the Enlightenment are 
marked by a paradox. Those who speak most confi- 
dently of it as a single, coherent project have little 
confidence in the alleged project's viability. Those who 
speak with most competence about the historical real- 
ity of the Enlightenment have little confidence in 
offering a general characterization of what the Enlight- 
enment was attempting to achieve. Thus, the Enlight- 
enment project is coherent only for those who are in 
the process of rejecting it, while those who examine it 
more closely find the object of their concern dissolving 
into a host of particulars. 
INVOKING CIVIL SOCIETY 
In the writings of scholars, social critics, and political 
activists, the invocation of civil society is even more 
pervasive than criticisms of the Enlightenment project. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, critics of authoritarian 
regimes in both Eastern Europe and Latin America 
used the notion as a rallying point (Arato and Cohen 
1992, 29-36, 48-69). Since then, it has played a major 
role in discussions of the prospects for democratization 
(Gellner 1996, 1-12). Over the last decade, social 
scientists have looked for signs of its emergence in 
societies where conventional wisdom assumed it did 
not exist (Hann and Dunn 1996; Schwedler 1995) and 
have sought to explain its apparent demise in the 
United States (Putnam 1995). Over the last few years 
its "renewal" has been the object both of foundation 
support and of proposed legislation-witness the 
Project for American Renewal drafted by Senator Dan 
Coats (R-Indiana), which consists of a series of mea- 
sures designed to halt "the decline of civil society7' by 
providing support for "families, churches, neighbor- 
hoods, voluntary associations" (Coats 1996). 
Like the Enlightenment project, the meaning of 
"civil society" tends to be rather elusive. Shils's (1992, 
3) often-quoted definition reads like a sketchy set of 
directions: "Civil society lies beyond the boundaries of 
the family and clan and beyond the locality; it lies short 
of the state." There is, however, a good deal to be 
found beyond the family but short of the state: markets, 
voluntary associations, churches, interest groups, labor 
unions, nongovernmental organizations, and Robert 
Putnam's (1995) steadily dwindling bowling leagues. It 
remains an open question whether much is gained by 
gathering these different forms of association together 
under a single label (Kumar 1993). Furthermore, rival 
sets of directions explain where civil society may be 
found: Arato and Cohen (1992, ix) differ from Shils by 
placing civil society "between economy and state" and 
arguing that it is "composed above all by the intimate 
sphere (especially the family), the sphere of association 
(especially voluntary associations), social movements, 
and forms of public communication." The possibilities 
for dispute about just what-and where-civil society 
is would appear to be endless. 
Invocations of civil society resemble criticisms of the 
American Political Science Review 
Enlightenment project in a second respect: They come 
from across the ideological spectrum (Walzer 1991). 
Opponents of authoritarian regimes employ the term 
to denote something like the rights and liberties long 
associated with liberal democracies. Radical democrats 
use it to denote the ideal of an engaged, ,active 
citizenry, directly involved in public deliberation. For 
libertarians, it designates a market society, free from 
political coercion. For communitarians, it evokes the 
network of voluntary associations and the civic virtues 
they engender. If the Enlightenment project serves as a 
catch-all category that designates whatever particular 
aspect of the modern world aggravates the critic who 
marshals it, so "civil society" appears to be an equally 
elastic category, designating whatever the social critic 
finds central to the particular vision of society that is 
being articulated. 
The looseness of the term may be attributed partly to 
the fact that, unlike "the Enlightenment," "civil soci- 
ety" has generally served as a theoretical concept used 
to designate a certain form of association rather than 
as a way of denoting a particular p e r i ~ d . ~  Theorists are 
thus at liberty to propose new definitions, often with 
only the slightest familiarity with earlier formulations. 
The term first entered the world as a way of translating 
koinonia politike, coined by Aristotle to describe the 
form of association more commonly termed a polis 
(Schmidt 1986). Until the close of the eighteenth 
century, "civil society" was employed, following the 
paradigm laid down by Aristotle, to designate that form 
of political association conventionally referred to as a 
"state" or civitas. This pattern of usage was taken over 
without alteration by natural law theorists. But by the 
early nineteenth century, it had been called into ques- 
tion (Schmidt 1995). Hegel's Philosophy of Right made 
use of a distinction between state and civil society that 
was unconventional enough to confuse his first review- 
ers (Schmidt 1982), and Tocqueville's drafts for De-
mocracy in America proposed a tripartite division into 
"religious," "civil," and "political" societies (Schleifer 
1980, 7). To speak, then, of civil society (following 
Hegel) as something distinct from both the family and 
the state, or (as in Tocqueville's initial drafts) from 
both religious and political forms of association is to 
suggest that there are patterns of association not 
adequately grasped by eighteenth-century political and 
legal theory. This altered use of "civil society" set the 
stage for the emergence of the various social sciences 
that went on to explore the domain carved out by the 
term. 
There was also considerable ambiguity as to just 
what the proper focus of the newly emerging social 
sciences might be. Recasting Hegers distinction be- 
6 There are notable exceptions. The German term burgerlichr Gesell- 
schaft can also be employed as a way of designating a particular 
historical form of social life, "bourgeois society." Marx made the 
most of the ambiguity in The German Ideology ([I8451 1975, 89): 
"Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social 
organization evolving directly out of production and commerce, 
which in all ages forms the basis of the state and of the rest of the 
idealistic superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the 
same name." 
Vol. 92, No. 2 
tween family, civil society, and the state into a dichot- 
omy between state and society, Stein ([I8501 1964, 50) 
saw sciences of society-as opposed to sciences of the 
state-as including the "sciences of economics, of 
labor, of householding economy and of national econ- 
omy, of the family and of law." Tocqueville, in contrast, 
turned from the consideration of the legal structure of 
the new American democracy to probe the patterns of 
association, the customs, manners, and mores, the 
"habits of the heart" that defined its mode of existence. 
And M a n  ([I8591 1970,20), interpreting civil society as 
the "sum total" of the "material conditions of life," 
argued that the "anatomy" of civil society was to be 
found in political economy. The nineteenth century's 
uncertainty about the boundaries of civil society con- 
tinues to be played out today in disputes over whether 
to include the intimate sphere of the family, whether 
civil society is reducible ultimately to the market, and 
whether it is opposed to or requires the existence of the 
state. 
The term "civil society" is unclear in one final 
respect. It can function either as a normative ideal used 
to designate the attributes that a political community 
ought to possess or as an analytic category that is used, 
within an empirical analysis, to designate a set of 
"ostensibly 'private' yet potentially autonomous public 
arenas distinct from the state" that prevent society 
from "degenerating into a shapeless mass" (Eisenstadt 
1992, ix). Locke used the term in the first of these 
senses when he argued that absolute monarchies are 
not "civil" societies, since their rulers are not re-
strained by the terms of the social contract. Social 
scientists use the term in the latter sense when, for 
example, they explore the informal networks of asso- 
ciation that provide the basis on which political struc- 
tures arise. Thus, when the term "civil society" is 
invoked, it is not only often unclear what exactly it 
encompasses-markets? informal organizations? the 
domestic sphere?-but also sometimes less than clear 
whether the author is offering an empirical analysis of 
an existing social order or postulating a vision of what 
a good society would look like (Seligman 1992, 201-6). 
As a result of the considerable elasticity of both the 
idea of civil society and the notion of an Enlightenment 
project, accounts of how the latter affected the former 
will diverge markedly, depending on the particular 
choices of the commentator. For example, while 
Berger and Neuhaus (who see mediating structures as 
rooted in particular, local circumstances) regard the 
Enlightenment project as undermining mediating 
structures (Berger and Neuhaus [I9761 1996, 161-2), 
Habermas (who understands civil society in terms of a 
public sphere of citizens engaged in free and open 
discussions) sees the development of civil society as a 
fulfillment of the incipient promise of the Enlighten- 
ment project (Habermas 1996, 329-87). Hence, any 
attempt to address the relationship between the En- 
lightenment project and civil society must first answer: 
Whose Enlightenment? Which civil society? 
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KANT ON ENLIGHTENMENT AND CIVILITY Kant (I17811 1929,593) insisted in the Critique ofpure 
Those who have sought to revive the concept of civil ~ e a s o n ,  "has no dictatorial authority; its-verdict is 
society have generally taken their departure from always simply the agreement of free citizens." O'Neill 
either Hegel or Tocqueville. They have thus tended to argues that the much-criticized tendency toward uni- 
versalization and abstraction in Kantian ethics follows 
overlook the contribution of a thinker who framed the from Kant's requirement that practical reasoning must 
relationship among civility, enlightenment, and society be "followable by those for whom it is to count asin a particularly suggestive fashion: Immanuel Kant. 
reasoning" (O'Neill 1996, 51-59). Late in 1784, Kant published two essays in successive 
issues of the ~erlinische ~onatsschrift: "Idea for a Nothing will count as a principle of reason if it demands 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" and submission to some unvindicated authority; anything that 
does count as a principle of reason must be one that all can 
u h to the ~ ~'what ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ :hswer ~ ~ l i ~ h ~ ~ ~ -
ment?n' On first glance, they seem to be pursuing 
rather different concerns. The "Universal History" 
essay, Kant was written in a 
~ublished in the Gothaische Gelehrte Zeitung, which 
mentioned a conversation in which Kant had outlined 
his ideas on the philosophy of history to a passing 
scholar. The secoid essay was prompted by an-earlier 
article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift, which had noted 
that the term "enlightenment" was frequently invoked 
in the journal but and had asked for a 
definition.' Yet, notwithstanding their diverging sub- 
ject matter and almost casual character, when read 
together the two essays provide a for at least 
some of the confusions that plague current discussions 
of the Enlightenment and civil society. They (1) offer a 
definition of the Enlightenment that rests on a novel 
conception of the "public use of reason," (2) employ 
the distinction between public and private uses of 
reason to distinguish civil society [biirgerliche Gesell- 
schaft] from cosmopolitan society [weltbiirgerliche Ge- 
sellschaft], and (3) use the perspective of a hypothetical 
cosmopolitan society as a critical vantage point from 
which to scrutinize civil society. 
Kant's "What Is Enlightenment?" is by now so 
familiar that it is easy to overlook how novel it was and 
how theoretically fecund it remains. He defined en-
lightenment not in terms of what it achieves but by 
what it escapes: "Enlightenment," the famous opening 
line proclaims, is "mankind's exit from its self-incurred 
[17841 35)' Moses19237 
Mendelssohn's response, published a few months ear- 
lier but not seen by Kant, had defined enlightenment as 
one of the "modifications of social life" that bring a 
people with the of man." Kant 
measured the advance of enlightenment in terms of the 
elimination of constraints on the "public use of rea- 
son."8 
In a number of important has 
stressed the significance of It takes 
practical reasoning as fundamental and invokes neither 
perfectionist presuppositions aboutthe proper ends of 
human action nor presuppositions about 
the validity of human reasoning (O'Neill 1989, 28-50: 
1990; 1996) The grounding for practical reasoning 
must be constructed rather than discovered: Reason, as 
For a discussion of the background to Kant's essay, see Schmidt 
1989. 
Compare Mendelssohn, "On the Question: What Is Enlighten- 
ment?n in schmidt 1996,53 with K  ~ ~hswer~ ,to the ~  ~ 
'What Is Enlightenment?' in Schmidt 1996, 59-60. 
follow. The principles of reason are those that can secure 
the possibility of intersubjectivity. Kant does not ground 
reason in actual consensus, or in the agreement and 
standards of any historical community; he grounds it in the 
repudiation of principles that preclude the possibility of 
open-ended interaction and communication (O'Neill 1990, 
194). 
Thus, what "communitarian" critics see as the central 
vice of the abstraction from partic-
ular, local norms and circumstances-is, for O'Neill, its 
central virtue. Insufficiently generalized explanations of 
practical reasoning, which require the acceptance of 
specific presuppositions or disputable ends, will be less 
likely to win intersubjective agreement than more 
abstract accounts of practical reasoning. "There are no 
general reasons for thinking,., O,Neill argues, ..that 
thick act descriptions are more comprehensible than 
thin ones" (O'Neill 1996, 6811). 
Kant,s distinction between private and public uses of 
reason plays an important role in his account of civil 
society. In Is Enlightenment?., he argues that 
when individuals are engaged in a "private" use of 
reason-a use constrained by the demands of the 
positions they hold and the associated duties and 
responsibilities-they function as "passive" parts of the 
of civil society. But individuals are never 
simply members of civil society. At moment they 
are also (if only potentially) members of a "cosmopol- 
itan society," and as members of this community they 
enjoy a right to the free and unrestricted public use of 
their reason. As participants in this cosmopolitan soci- 
ety of writers and readers, individuals retain the right 
to criticize the demands made upon them as members 
of the civil society in which they reside. 
private uses of reason are limited by presuppositions 
that must simply be accepted as a condition for occu-
pying a particular post Kant ([17841 1923, 38) argues, 
for example, that a clergyman assigned the task of 
instructing students in the central beliefs of the faith 
does not have the right to instruct students in his own 
diverging interpretation of the church doctrine. Simply 
because private uses of reason are embedded in ongo- 
ing practices and institutions, they will often be 
difficultfor outsiders to follow than public uses. The 
latter, simply because they take less as ,given, will of 
necessitv be framed in a more abstract and universal 
voice. AS a result, civil society confronts its members 
with a host of local rules and restrictions that simply 
must be accepted as given. Only when these same 
~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ :individuals conceive of themselves as citizens of a 
cosmopolitan society will they be in a position to 
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examine the rationality of the practices in which they 
are engaged in their role as members of civil society. 
The opposition between civil and cosmopolitan view- 
points is thus central to Kant's understanding of the 
nature of enlightenment. 
The opposition of civil and cosmopolitan society had 
already been deployed, for different purposes, in Kant's 
"Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Purpose," which appeared one month before "What Is 
Enlightenment?" In the earlier essay, Kant argued that 
"the greatest problem for the human species, the 
solution of which nature compels it to seek, is that of 
attaining a civil society which can administer justice 
universally" (Kant [I7841 1923, 22). The solution, 
however, turns out to be "subordinate to the problem 
of a law-governed external relationship with other 
states" (p. 24). Justice within civil society cannot be 
achieved as long as states are engaged in constant 
preparations for conflict with one another, but-in the 
famous paradox on which the essay turns-it is pre- 
cisely the considerable costs of war and the prepara- 
tions for war that provide the external impetus for 
states to reform their own constitutions in the direction 
of republican forms of rule. The driving mechanism 
behind the entire process is the equally paradoxical 
notion of "unsocial sociability": the tension, endemic to 
the human race, of desiring both to live in society with 
others and to live as an individual (pp. 20-1). Civil 
society appears in this essay as a domain racked with 
antagonisms and tensions that provide the impetus for 
creating a cosmopolitan order, which in turn provides 
the background conditions needed for attainment of a 
just civil order. Once again, Kant provides an account 
of civil society which refuses to downplay the particu- 
larity and individuality that rules in civil society, but he 
also refuses to grant it the last word. 
It is difficult to square much in Kant's account of civil 
society with recent discussions. The imagery he em- 
ploys in the descriptio? of civil society in "What Is 
Enlightenment?" is hardly appealing: He  likens it to a 
machine, and individuals are but passive cogs in its 
gearwork. The "Universal History" account of "unso- 
cial sociability" is far removed from the cozy assurance 
that when "civil society is strong, it infuses a commu- 
nity with its warmth" (Coats 1996, 25). Both accounts 
also depart from recent discussions by remaining true 
to the conventions of natural law theory and using state 
and civil society as equivalent terms.9 While those who 
have taken Hegel, Marx, or Tocqueville as their model 
have sought to explain changes in political society by 
W e e  Kant's equation o f  "civil condition (status civilis)" with the 
"state (civitas)" in Rechtslehre 943 (Kant [I7971 1907, 311) and his 
contrast o f  "juridical-civil society [rechtltche biirgerliche Gesellschaft]" 
to "ethical-civil society [ethische biirgerliche Gesellschaft]" in Religion 
within the Limits ofReasonAlone (Kant [I7931 1960,86-8,90-1,93). 
Seligman (1992,43),nevertheless, argues that Kant does not view the 
state as "coterminus" with civil society, since "the publicness o f  
rational debate and critique is seen (and indeed emphasized) as the 
province of  civil society in its distinction from the State." This is 
difficult to square with Kant's own writings, which consistently equate 
state and civil society and which see public debate and discussion as 
evolving within a "cosmopolitan" (weltbiirgerlich), rather than a 
"civil" (biirgerlich) society. 
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examining the economic and social forces that operate 
within the domain they designate as "civil society," it is 
the opposition between civil and cosmopolitan society 
that is central to Kant's argument. The impetus for 
changes in the nature of public life comes from indi- 
viduals learning to think of themselves as members of 
a society which transcends the individual state, not 
from individuals framing their actions in response to 
forces that originate somewhere beyond the family yet 
short of the state. 
The weaknesses of Kant's argument should not be 
minimized. His example of a military officer criticizing 
in scholarly journals the policies that he executes on 
the battlefield (Kant [I7841 1923, 37-8) seems terribly 
naive after the outrages of the last two centuries. And 
while he grants (in his discussion of the clergyman 
whose criticisms of his faith leave him unable to carry 
out in good conscience the duties demanded by the 
"private use" of his reason) that individuals may come 
to a point at which their "public" misgivings necessitate 
their resignation from their "private" position (p. 38), it 
is not at all clear how this can be applied to the case of 
the taxpayer who disagrees with the policies of the 
government that her taxes support. Must she remain 
content with letters to newspapers and articles in 
journals? Does her public use of reason have no means 
of expression other than the written page? Could it not 
also take the form of a refusal to pay taxes as an act of 
civil disobedience in concert with others dissenting 
from such policies? 
But neither should the abiding strengths of Kant's 
position be underestimated. Nowhere do they become 
more apparent than in the difficulties faced by theorists 
who have attempted to derive ethical and legal norms 
from current conceptions of civil society. 
CIVILITY AS A VIRTUE? 
For Kant, civil society denotes that form of association 
proper to a state or civitas,a society ruled by laws that 
pass a universalization test, which requires them to 
respect the attributes of "lawful freedom," "civil equal- 
ity," and "civil independence" that citizens possess as 
hypothetical contractants who agree to subject them- 
selves to civil order (Kant [I7971 1907, 311-6).1° As 
such, Kant views civil society as a norm against which 
states are to be evaluated. By transforming the term 
into a set of institutions located somewhere between 
the individual and the state, those thinkers who have 
sought to define norms of "civility" have typically 
rejected the sorts of universalization tests to which 
Kant appealed. A brief consideration of Shils's attempt 
to describe the virtue of "substantive civility" suggests 
some of the difficulties encountered by such ap-
proaches. 
Substantive civility is the virtue o f  civil society. It is the 
readiness to moderate particular, individual or parochial 
interests and to give precedence to the common good. 
. . . Whenever two antagonistic advocates arrive at a com-
promise through recognition o f  a common interest, 
InThis is Kant's reformulation o f  the idea o f  the social contract. 
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they redefine themselves as members of a collectivity, the 
good of which has precedence over their particular objec- 
tives. The good which is accorded precedence by that 
decision might be no more than the continued existence of 
the collectivity in which they both participate. The com- 
mon good is acknowledged wherever a more inclusive 
collectivity is acknowledged. 
Every action in which thinking of and attempting to 
reduce the prospective loss inflicted on one section of a 
society when another section would benefit from a partic- 
ular event of policy is an act of substantive civility. It is 
always possible to consider the consequences of any par- 
ticular action in the light of its effect on the wider circle 
within which a decision is made. Every action which bears 
in mind the well-being of a more inclusive collectivity is an 
action on behalf of the common good (Shils 1992, 16-7). 
There are three immediate problems with Shils's for- 
mulation. First, the blanket assertion of the primacy of 
the good of the "more inclusive collectivity" over 
"particular, individual, or parochial interests" is 
fraught with difficulties. Is Shils seriously proposing 
that any assertion of individual rights against the 
greater good of the collectivity is an affront to the 
virtue of civil society? Does the good of a "more 
inclusive collectivity" always trump the rights of indi- 
viduals? Second, what sort of metric are agents sup- 
posed to apply when they reflect on whether the 
consequences of their actions will advance the good of 
the collectivity? What degree of uncertainty about the 
complex chain of causes that link actions to conse-
quences is tolerable? Finally, Shils's statement that it is 
"always possible to consider the consequences of any 
particular action in the light of its effect on the wider 
circle" raises an obvious question: What falls within 
"the wider circle"? Should the effect on future gener- 
u 

ations be considered part of our "common good"? And 
what of present and future members of other societies? 
When contrasted with Shils's attemDt to articulate a 
set of virtues specific to civil society, many of the 
conventional criticisms of Kant's views on enlighten- 
ment and civil society lose their force. Complaints 
about the Enlightenment's "excessive" concern with
" 
individual rights pale in comparison to a concept of 
civic virtue which, in its embrace of "communitarian" 
goods, would open the way to state intervention in 
domains that it long ago vacated, so long as we have 
assurances that the "public good" is being served. It 
may be the case, for example, that the enforcement of 
religious conformity would advance the "common 
good" of societies with a fair measure of religious 
homogeneity. But this hardly is a compelling reason for 
rejecting well-established principles of religious liberty. 
Likewise, it is by no means clear that an attempt to 
assess the conseauences of actions on a less than 
clearly defined community giyes us any greater guid- 
ance than Kant's attempt to construct an account 
which, by focusing on the intelligibility of practical 
reasoning, frees us from the necessity of calculating 
elusive chains of causal connections. Finally, whereas 
Shils can provide no reason for limiting the scope of 
ethical concern to a particular civil society, Kant ex- 
plicitly recognizes that any account of the moral im- 
provement of individual states must of necessity con- 
sider the relationship between actions within state 
borders and those involving the international commu- 
nity. 
There are thus good reasons for being suspicious of 
the well-worn arguments against Enlightenment uni- 
versalism and the new-found enthusiasm for the virtue 
of civil society. The Enlightenment project remains too 
ill-defined a notion to serve as an object either of 
allegiance or condemnation. What is needed instead is 
a careful weighing of the variety of different commit- 
ments and intentions-not all of them reconcilable- 
carelessly lumped together under that label. But as has 
been suggested above, to undertake a critical examina- 
tion of these different claims is to take up a task which, 
with less violence to history than other accounts, might 
well be characterized as the Enlightenment project. 
With regard to the current enthusiasm for the virtues 
of civility, vigilance of a different sort is required. In so 
far as "civil society" is a category of analysis in the 
social sciences, the question is whether this new use of 
an historical term advances our knowledge of the social 
factors that promote the emergence of democratic 
institutions. The answer will be decided by the quality 
of empirical research that the concept fosters." With 
regard to the normative use of the concept, even 
greater skepticism may be justified. A rich tradition 
within political philosophy has sought to define civil 
society-understood as the most general term avail- 
able for designating that form of association in which 
public life transpires-in terms of the norms of liberty, 
equality, and justice. Until we see a more compelling 
reason for giving preference to the alleged virtues of 
civility over the stricter demands of justice, we may be 
forced to second the advice that the Evangelist gives to 
the Pilgrim in John Bunyan's great allegory: "Mr. 
Legality is a cheat; and as for his son Civility, notwith- 
standing his simpering looks, he is but a hypocrite and 
cannot help thee." And just as the Evangelist advises 
that "there is nothing in all this noise, that thou hast 
heard of sottish men, but a design to beguile thee of thy 
salvation," so, too, we may do well to ask whether all 
this noise about civility is anything more than a design 
to turn us away from that concern with justice which 
lies at the heart of any "Enlightenment project" worth 
defending. 
l 1  For dissenting views on the analytic usefulness of the category, see 
Kumar 1993 and Seligman 1992. 
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